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Regional Institutions, Financial Analysts and Stock Price Informativeness 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of legal institutions on the external governance role of 
equity analysts in enhancing the corporate information environment. By analysing a sample 
of Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2013, we find that analyst coverage is positively 
related to stock price informativeness. Firms located in provinces where legal institutions are 
stronger, as indicated by better development of market intermediaries and lower levies and 
charges on firms, are less likely to withhold value-relevant information. Financial analysts 
play a more effective role in improving stock informativeness in provinces with less 
developed legal institutions.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A broad literature has investigated the governance role of financial analysts, but presents 
somewhat mixed evidence. For example, consistent with the premise that financial analysts 
facilitate intra-industry information transfer, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find that analyst 
forecasting activity is positively associated with stock return synchronicity, suggesting that 
stock prices incorporate less firm-specific information (which leads to lower stock price 
informativeness). However, Ayers and Freeman (2003) show that prices of firms with higher 
analyst following incorporate future earnings more rapidly than firms with lower analyst 
coverage, implying a positive relation between analyst coverage and stock price 
informativeness. In this study, we examine the association between analyst coverage and 
stock price informativeness by considering the regional heterogeneity of legal institutions in 
China.  
Financial analysts are important financial intermediaries between firms and the market, 
as they routinely collect and process firm-specific information from corporate insiders and 
subsequently disseminate the information to current and prospective investors (Chung and Jo, 
1996). We suggest that analyst coverage can enhance firm-level stock price informativeness 
through multiple channels. First, previous studies (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006; Piotroski 
and Roulston, 2004) suggest that analysts increase the availability of industry-level 
information because they have the expertise to interpret and disseminate information across 
firms operating in a specific industry. Furthermore, the reports and buy/sell recommendations 
issued by analysts convey useful firm-specific information, and reduce the cost of 
information acquisition (Easley et al., 1998). As a result, informed investors may take the 
informational advantage by trading in a timely manner, leading to more firm-specific 
information being capitalized into stock price. Second, analyst scrutiny is likely to monitor 
managerial behaviour and make it increasingly difficult for managers to expropriate investors 
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by withholding information (Lang et al., 2004). Previous literature contends that analysts play 
a key role in detecting managers’ opportunistic behaviour and promoting the quality of 
financial reporting, because analysts are well trained to go through financial statements and 
track firms on a regular basis (Yu, 2008; Cheng et al., 2016). Analysts in turn improve the 
quality of corporate disclosure and decrease the cost of obtaining private information. Taken 
together, we expect to find support for a positive association between analyst coverage and 
stock price informativeness in China.  
Extant studies have indicated that regional environment is an important determinant of 
firms’ activities (Wang and Lin, 2013). As the largest emerging economy in the world, 
China’s development has been unbalanced across its different regions on various aspects 
(Demurger, 2001; Fan and Wang, 2010; Tsui, 1996). Wojcik (2006) shows that the rate of 
change in convergence of corporate governance is uneven from country to country. The 
World Justice Project ranks China 80th in the world by Rule of Law Index.  Transparency 
International ranks China 79th in the world by Corruption index. More importantly, there is a 
disparity in the legal institutions across regions in term of protection of property rights, law 
enforcement, and development of financial and product markets (Hasan et al., 2009; Lin et al., 
2010; An et al., 2016). In more developed regions where investor protection and protection of 
property rights are relatively strong, managers face greater pressure to protect the interests of 
investors by constraining self-serving behaviour and enhancing corporate transparency. 
Meanwhile, local governments are less likely to expropriate firms. Managers therefore have a 
greater incentive to voluntarily provide firm-specific information to the market. Stock 
informativeness in these regions are expected to be higher and investors less rely on the 
governance role of financial analysts. China provides a unique opportunity to explore the 
interplay between analyst coverage, imbalanced institutional development and stock price 
informativeness. 
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In this study, our measure of stock price informativeness is price non-synchronicity, 
which is proposed by Roll (1988) and widely used in the literature (Morck et al., 2000; 
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). We use the number of analysts following a firm as the 
measure of analyst coverage. Based on the analysis of Chinese listed firms over the period 
between 2003 and 2013, we find that stock price informativeness is positively associated with 
analyst coverage and the regional legal institutions. Furthermore, the effect of analyst 
coverage on stock price informativeness is less pronounced in regions with developed 
institutions. Our results are robust to the inclusion of firm-specific characteristics and 
governance variables identified in previous literature as affecting price informativeness.  
This study makes contribution to the literature on corporate governance and legal 
institutions. First, it adds to the literature on the external governance mechanism by shedding 
light on the ongoing debate on the governance role of financial analysts. We provide original 
evidence on the association between analyst coverage and stock price informativeness based 
firms from China. Second, it contributes to the studies of economic geography by providing 
evidence that regional legal institutions influence corporate information environment and the 
governance role of financial analysts. The results increase the understanding of economic 
consequence of uneven regional development within a country, and highlight the importance 
of reducing the development gap of legal institutions. Finally, our research is of interest to 
regulators and policymakers to improve the information environment of the Chinese capital 
markets.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and methodology. Section 4 presents 
the empirical findings and Section 5 concludes. 
 
Related literature and hypothesis development 
Financial analysts and the information environment  
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The financial analyst industry has experienced remarkable growth in parallel with the 
rapid development of the Chinese stock market. By the end of 2013, there were 115 security 
companies in China; 84 consultancy firms have been approved by CSRC (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission) to provide investment consultancy services, with more than 2,500 
qualified financial analysts being employed by both security firms and consultancy firms. 
Empirical studies show that analyst promotes stock market efficiency in China.  
There are two streams of related literature on the role of financial analysts in promoting 
information environment. First, a large body of literature has examined the role of financial 
analysts as information intermediaries between firms and external investors. Because analysts 
collect information from both public and private sources, evaluate the current performance of 
a firm, make forecasts about its future prospects, and issue buy, hold or sell recommendations 
to investors, analyst coverage is likely to improve the transparency and decrease the 
information asymmetry of a firm under scrutiny (Chung and Jo, 1996; Lang et al., 2004). 
Empirical evidence largely supports this prediction. Roulstone (2003) shows that increased 
analyst following leads to increased liquidity because analysts are able to reduce information 
asymmetry between a firm’s investors and managers.  
Another stream of literature analyses the determinants of stock price informativeness at 
both country and firm levels. From a theoretical perspective, the lack of transparency, 
contagion and investors’ sentiment are associated with less private information being 
impounded into stock price, which is reflected in low stock price informativeness (Jin and 
Myers, 2006). Empirically, Morck et al. (2000) show that country-level stock price 
informativeness is higher in countries with well-developed financial systems and better 
investor protection. Consistent with the view that stock price becomes more informative 
when it contains more private information about the firm, Durnev et al. (2003) report that 
stock price informativeness is highly correlated with the ability of stock price to predict 
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future earnings. Taking the mandatory IFRS adoption across 14 EU countries between 2003 
and 2007 as an external shock, Beuselinck et al. (2010) find that mandatory IFRS adoption 
reveals new firm-specific information in the year of adoption, which is reflected by increased 
stock price informativeness. Yu (2011) shows that stock price Informativeness, measured by 
firm-specific return variation and future earnings response coefficient, increases with the 
quality of firm-level corporate governance. Furthermore, the results are more pronounced in 
countries with strong investor protection, which suggests that country-level and firm-level 
governance act as complements rather than supplements in influencing stock price 
informativeness. However, prior research also documents a negative association between 
analyst coverage and stock price informativeness. For example, Crawford et al. (2012) find 
that initiation of analyst coverage facilitates the flow of industry- and market-wide 
information, which results in stock return being more synchronous with market return (price 
being less informative). Overall, the evidence on the association between analyst coverage 
and stock price informativeness is mixed and inconclusive. 
Hypothesis development 
Financial analysts play both a monitoring role, when they demand and collect 
information from corporate insiders (i.e., managers), and an information role, when they 
analyse and disseminate information to external investors. Regarding the monitoring role, 
recent evidence suggests that financial analysts play a key role in constraining the earnings 
management practice of firms which they follow, because analysts have the necessary 
expertise and knowledge to go through financial reports and track firms on a regular basis 
(Yu, 2008). Consistent with the view that analysts act as an important information 
intermediary between the firm and market, Sun (2011) shows that income smoothing 
enhances earnings informativeness more significantly for firms with high analyst coverage. 
Prior research shows that analysts also help to reduce information asymmetry in the public 
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debt market, because analyst coverage is positively associated with firms’ credit rating (Chen 
and Subramanyam, 2008). Overall, greater analyst coverage results in a rich information 
environment for the firm, which likely contributes to higher stock price informativeness. We 
hereby propose the first hypothesis as follows: 
H1:  There is a positive association between the analyst coverage and stock price 
informativeness of Chinese listed firms. 
However, as documented in Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), in the US, analyst coverage 
leads to great stock price co-movement (less stock price informativeness), because analysts 
gather information at both firm and industry levels and disseminate common information 
across all firms in an industry. To the extent that analyst coverage in China also contributes to 
intra-industry information transfer, we would find a negative association between analyst 
coverage and stock price informativeness. This would work against us finding evidence 
supporting H1. 
Previous research suggests that institutional development is an important determinant of 
stock price informativeness. For example, Morck et al. (2000) document that China has one 
of the lowest levels of stock price informativeness in their sample of countries, and they 
attribute this to the weak investor protection in China. China is characterised by unequal 
economic and institutional development across regions within the country. The economic and 
market development of the coastal provinces is more advanced than that of the western and 
inland provinces (Demurger, 2001; Fan and Wang, 2004; First et al., 2006; Tsui, 1996). In 
particular, the legal enforcement varies considerably across regions. Leyshon (2008) argues 
that if corporate borrowers desire cheaper capital in more developed countries (or regions), 
corporate managers may face the pressure of moving toward transparency as investors require 
greater amounts of corporate information. Consequently, we suggest that the level of 
corporate governance and, in turn, the level of corporate transparency or informativeness can 
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vary across regions in China. Stock price informativeness is likely to be high in more 
developed regions with a better legal environment and advanced market intermediaries This 
leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2:  There is a positive association between the level of regional institutions and stock 
price informativeness of Chinese listed firms. 
Because legal enforcement and protection of property rights are relatively strong in 
regions with more advanced institutions, firm managers in these regions are under greater 
market pressure to voluntarily disclose firm-specific information. In addition, firms are less 
likely to face expropriation, and managers do not need to withhold information. As a result, 
investors rely less on analysts’ governance role. Analyst coverage is less critical in promoting 
information environment when the regional institutions are strong. We hereby propose the 
third hypothesis. 
H3: The association between analyst coverage and stock price informativeness is more 
(less) pronounced in regions with less (more) developed institutions. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data and sample 
The data used in our study are mainly from CSMAR (China Securities Market and 
Accounting Research). Our sample period begins in 2003, the first year when data on analyst 
coverage are available. We include all listed firms on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges between 2003 and 2013. To construct the informativeness measure, the Chinese 
market returns are collected from DataStream and the US stock market returns are collected 
from CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices). The data on provincial legal institutions 
are from Fan et al. (2010). There are 12,750 firm-year observations included in the 
subsequent analysis.  
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Measure of stock price informativeness 
Our measure of stock price informativeness is price non-synchronicity, which was 
first proposed by Roll (1988) and further developed by Morck et al. (2000). In equation 1 (2) 
we consider the systematic stock return of the Chinese stock market (both Chinese and US 
markets). For each firm i in week t, we regress firm-level return in excess of the 7-day 
interbank offered rate in China (proxy of risk-free rate) on the Chinese and US market return. 
We require a minimum of 45 weekly observations within a 12-month period to perform the 
analysis. 
ti
CN
tti rmr ,10,            (1) 
ti
US
t
CN
tti rmrmr ,210,           (2) 
where  is the weekly excess return in the Chinese market, computed as the return of 
the Shanghai Composite Index minus the 7-day interbank rate in China;  is the weekly 
excess return of the US stock market, calculated as the value-weighted return on all NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate, the proxy of risk-free rate 
in the US. Each firm-specific time-series regression produces a goodness-of-fit measure (
2
,tiR ). 
Using either equation (1) or (2), we can decompose total stock return variations into 1) the 
variation induced by the market-wide factor, and 2) the variation induced by firm-specific factors. 
The stock price informativeness measure is defined as the ratio of firm-specific return variation to 
market-wide variation. Following Fernandes and Ferreria (2008), we compute the informativeness 
measure with the following logarithmic transformation: 







 

2
,
2
,
,
1
log
ti
ti
ti
R
R
            (3) 
Ψi,t thus measures firm-specific stock return variation relative to market-wide 
variation, and a higher value reflects that stock price contains more firm-specific information. 
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We denote the stock price informativeness measures derived from Eq. 1 (2) as Ψ1 (Ψ2). We 
use Ψ1 (Ψ2) in the main analysis (robustness check). 
 
Regression models  
Following prior research (Crawford et al., 2012; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; 
Roulstone, 2003), we employ the number of analysts, brokers and reports that follow a firm 
as the measure of analyst coverage. To mitigate the concern of reverse causality, we take the 
lead-lag approach by regressing the informativeness measure for firm i in year t+1 on analyst 
coverage measures in year t-1. Our analysis includes three sets of control variables that are 
identified by previous studies as having an impact on the level of stock price informativeness. 
The one-year lagged control variables include firm-specific characteristics, prior performance, 
ownership, auditing quality and board characteristics. These variables are defined in Table 1. 
We also include industry- and firm-fixed effects to control for time-invariant characteristics 
in the empirical analyses.  
   
k
k kkti
ControlCoverageenessInformativ
1 21,10

                                                  (4)
 
The dependent variable is stock informativeness measures Ψ1 or Ψ2. The key explanatory 
variable is Coverage, which is the number of financial analysts, brokers or reports following 
firm I in year t-1. H1 predicts that analyst coverage is positively associated with stock price 
informativeness as reflected by a positive and significant a1 .  
To test H2 and H3 we incorporate regional institution, analyst coverage and their 
interaction in a regression model as follows. 
  



k
k kk
titi
Control
RegionCoverageRegionCoverageenessInformativ
1 3
1,321,10


                (5)
 
 The legal institutions proxies are developed by the National Economic Research 
Institute in China (NERI). We focus on the sub-indices that measure 1) development of 
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market intermediaries (i.e. accounting firms and law firms); and 2) levies and charges on 
firms (Berkowitz et al., 2015). If developed legal institution is associated with higher stock 
price informativeness as predicted by H2, 2  should be significantly positive. H3 predicts a 
significantly negative b3  in that analyst coverage matters less when regional legal institutions 
are strong.  
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables applied in our multivariate 
regression analyses. Our sample period covers 2003 to 2013. The stock price informativeness 
measure, Ψ1 (Ψ2), has a mean of 0.873 (0.727) and a standard deviation of 1.103 (0.943). Ψ1 
(Ψ2) varies considerably, from 0.162 (0.085) (25% percentile) to 1.336 (1.202) (75% 
percentile). On average, our sample firm is followed by 4.632 analysts. The standard 
deviation of the analyst coverage measure is larger than its mean which reflects high 
dispersion in the analyst coverage among Chinese listed firms. This is consistent with the 
observation that the first quartile of analyst coverage is zero whereas the third quartile is five. 
For the average firm in our sample, the mean firm growth rate (PB ratio) is 3.204. It is worth 
noting that 5.6% of the sample firms experience two-year consecutive loss, while 5.8% of our 
sample firms are audited by a big 4 auditor. Regarding the ownership structure of the average 
firm in the sample, the shareholding of foreign investors is 1.3%, and mutual fund owns 3.8% 
of free-traded shares. 18.2% of the sampled firms have a CEO also being Chairman of the 
board of directors.  
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
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Results on tests of H1  
        Table 3 presents results supporting H1 that stock price informativeness is positively 
associated with analyst coverage. We provide the results of three models. In all models, we 
incorporate a complete set of control variables. The coefficient of Coverage is positive and 
significant at the 5% level across all models when the number of analysts, brokers and reports 
are employed as measures of analyst coverage respectively. These suggest that the stock price 
of a firm becomes more informative when the firm is followed by more analysts, brokers and 
reports. A plausible explanation is that different analysts have their own, non-overlapping 
information channels through which they acquire information, indicating that an increasing 
amount of firm-specific information is collected and disseminated to the market for firms 
followed by more analysts. Meanwhile, they exert pressure on CEOs to disclose information 
on a timely manner. The positive association between stock price informativeness and analyst 
coverage is robust to the controls of firm size, growth opportunity, special treatment effect, 
foreign ownership, mutual fund ownership, ownership concentration, big 4 auditors and 
board characteristics, as well as industry and time effects.  
         Regarding the control variables on firm-specific characteristics, the coefficients of firm 
size and growth are significantly negative at the 1% level. This is consistent with the findings 
reported by Gul et al. (2010). The positive coefficient of fund ownership suggests that the 
level of stock price informativeness is higher for firms with larger fund ownership, and this is 
in line with the literature suggesting that better-quality corporate governance and reporting is 
promoted by the external monitoring of mutual funds (Ding et al., 2013). In line with 
previous literature, the level of firm informativeness is positively related with corporate 
growth rate and ownership concentration. Of the corporate governance variables, the 
coefficient of board meeting is significantly negative, suggesting that stock price is less 
informative for firms with more board meetings than the sample median. Board independence 
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has a positive impact on corporate transparency, consistent with previous studies of Chinese 
stock markets, where minority shareholder protection is weak. Finally, the level of 
informativeness is lower for NSOE firms, and the big 4 dummy has no significant effect in 
promoting the corporate information environment.  
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
 
Results on tests of H2 and H3 
 Table 4 present the results on the impact of regional institutions on stock price 
informativeness (H2) and the moderating effect of regional institutions on the governance 
role of analyst coverage. Panels A and B of provide the results for two measures of regional 
legal institutions. Panel A includes the index describing the development of market 
intermediaries, namely law firms and accounting firms, analyst coverage and their interaction 
term. The coefficient of Region is significantly positive at the 1% level across the models, 
suggesting that stock price informativeness is higher in regions with more developed legal 
environment. This is consistent with the findings in economic geography documented by 
Gordon and McCann (2000), Bauer et al. (2008), Wang and Lin (2013), Cumming et al. 
(2014), suggesting that regional environment can affect firm outcome. The disparity in the 
development of regional institutions has a significant effect on the corporate information 
environment of public firms. Panel B is based on the index describing the burden of non-tax 
levies and charges across different provinces. Likewise, the coefficient of Region remains 
significant and positive across the models, suggesting that stock price informativeness is 
higher in regions with a greater tax burden. Overall, our results lend credence to H2.  
The coefficients of interaction between coverage and region in two Panels are 
significantly negative in general supporting H3. The results are stronger in Table B showing 
that firms less need to conceal value-relevant information when they do not face expropriate 
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from the local government.  
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
Robustness checks 
We conduct several sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our results. Instead of 
using an informativeness measure derived from weekly excess return of the Chinese stock 
market (Ψ1), we employ an alternative informativeness measure that is derived from weekly 
excess returns of both the Chinese and US market indices (Ψ2), and we repeat the analysis. 
The results, reported in Table 5, remain consistent with our main findings. In order to control 
the influence of outliers, we apply the bootstrapped quantile regression technique for 
estimating the regressions after controlling for both region and firm fixed effects. The 
untabulated results are consistent with the main results, rendering further support to our 
hypotheses.   
Finally, a potential confounding factor for the change of price informativeness during our 
sample period is the mandatory convergence of CGAAP (Chinese Generally Accepted 
Accounting principle) towards IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standard), effective 
from 2007. IFRS adoption may improve the corporate information environment by promoting 
transparency and increasing the comparability of financial reports. Because all Chinese listed 
firms have their fiscal year ending in December, we expect that the convergence of CGAAP 
towards IFRS would only affect financial statements issued in 2008 and after. Therefore, we 
exclude the observations from 2008 and repeat the analysis. The untabulated results remain 
consistent with our main findings, suggesting that findings supporting our hypotheses are not 
due to the introduction of IFRS. 
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the association between stock price informativeness and 
analyst coverage in China. The analysis of a sample of Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 
2013 supports our conjecture that there is a positive association between stock price 
informativeness and analyst coverage, suggesting that financial analysts refrain mangers from 
withholding firm-specific information. Next, we find that stock price informativeness is 
higher in regions with more developed market intermediaries and less government 
expropriation. Furthermore, the association between analyst coverage and informativeness is 
less pronounced in these regions. The results add to the  literature of economic geography 
that, in addition to the corporate board and financial intermediaries, regional environment is 
an important determinant of firm policy and outcome (see Gordon and McCann, 2000; Clark 
and Wojcik, 2007; Bauer et al., 2008; Wang and Lin, 2013; and Cumming et al., 2014).  
There are some potential avenues for future research. It is promising to examine how 
the regional religion or alternative legal institutions influence such as xinfang influence the 
ethical climate of business and investor protection which in turn determine the corporate 
information environment (Cao, et al. 2016; An et al., 2016). In addition, it is worthwhile to 
explore whether the regional political uncertainty influence corporate information 
environment (Cao et al., 2017).  
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Table 1. Defination of Variables 
 
Ψ1 (Ψ2) 
 
Ψ1 (Ψ2) is a stock price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-
series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on Chinese (Chinese and US) stock 
market weekly excess returns. 
Report The number of analysts’ reports issued for the firm. 
Analyst The number of financial analysts following the firm. 
Broker The brokerage house issuing analysts’ reports for the firm. 
NSOE 
 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a non-state-owned-enterprise, i.e. a privately-
controlled firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Intermediary 
 
The development level of market intermediaries (i.e. law firms and accounting firms) in the 
province. The data is from Fan et al. (2010). 
Levies 
 
The burden of the non-tax levies and charges to local firms. A higher value indicates a lower 
burden. The data is from Fan et al. (2010). 
 
Control Variables  
 
Size The natural logarithm of market capitalization. 
Growth Price-to-book ratio. 
ST 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a listed firm experiences consecutive two-year or longer 
loss and is therefore labelled by the stock exchange as receiving “Special Treatment” to 
indicate delisting risks, and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign The number of foreign shares relative to the total number of shares. 
Fund The number of shares held by mutual fund relative to the total number of shares. 
OwnCon The Herfindahl index of the ten largest blockholders of the firm. 
Big4 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the listed firm is audited by one of the big 4 audit firms 
(i.e. PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG), and 0 otherwise. 
Duality 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO also holds the position of board chair, and 0 
otherwise. 
Dmeet 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board meetings is above the median value of 
the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise. 
Dbsize 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board members is above the median value of 
the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise. 
Drind 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is above the median 
value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise. 
Dssize 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is above the 
median value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics. Variables are defined in Table 1.  
 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. 25% 50% 75% 
Ψ1 17220 0.873 1.103 0.162 0.691 1.336 
Ψ2 17220 0.727 0.943 0.085 0.601 1.202 
Analyst 25273 4.632 8.821 0 0 5 
Broker 25273 3.48 6.375 0 0 4 
Report 25273 18.931 42.648 0 0 16 
Levies 15218 13.906 1.941 13.42 14.58 15.19 
Intermediary 15640 5.234 2.596 3.03 5.55 7.2 
SIZE 17476 21.879 1.104 21.135 21.762 22.492 
Growth 17466 3.204 62.778 1.606 2.455 4.048 
OwnCon 17892 0.051 0.096 0 0.003 0.057 
Big4 18023 0.058 0.234 0 0 0 
Foreign 18017 0.013 0.069 0 0 0 
Fund 18020 0.038 0.071 0 0.004 0.042 
Duality 15642 0.182 0.386 0 0 0 
Dbsize 17859 0.254 0.435 0 0 1 
Drind 17859 0.41 0.492 0 0 1 
Dssize 18018 0.406 0.491 0 0 1 
Dmeet 18014 0.431 0.495 0 0 1 
ST 25273 0.056 0.23 0 0 0 
NSOE 17941 0.423 0.494 0 0 1 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
Table 3. Stock Informativeness and Analyst Coverage 
 
This table presents the test of H1. Variables are defined in Table 1.  We control for industry-cluster 
effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
 
 
 Analyst Broker Report 
Coverage 0.006** 0.007** 0.001** 
 (3.818) (3.442) (3.197) 
SIZE -0.424*** -0.422*** -0.420*** 
 (-21.406) (-21.174) (-25.395) 
NSOE -0.114** -0.114** -0.114** 
 (-2.927) (-2.938) (-2.933) 
Growth 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (3.756) (3.737) (3.770) 
OwnCon 0.940*** 0.951*** 0.934*** 
 (19.167) (19.501) (20.684) 
Big4 -0.139 -0.139 -0.138 
 (-0.927) (-0.923) (-0.912) 
Foreign -0.386* -0.390* -0.368* 
 (-2.654) (-2.643) (-2.555) 
Fund 3.317*** 3.305*** 3.324*** 
 (15.249) (15.163) (15.407) 
Duality -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 
 (-1.182) (-1.191) (-1.161) 
Dbsize 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (0.190) (0.195) (0.175) 
Drind 0.036* 0.035* 0.035* 
 (2.349) (2.365) (2.387) 
Dssize 0.052 0.052 0.053 
 (0.935) (0.946) (0.958) 
Dmeet -0.030* -0.030* -0.031* 
 (-2.447) (-2.418) (-2.687) 
ST 0.287*** 0.287*** 0.286*** 
 (9.778) (9.839) (9.924) 
Constant 9.956*** 9.899*** 9.876*** 
 (20.846) (20.627) (24.003) 
Fixed effect Y Y Y 
Industry Y Y Y 
Obs 12,750 12,750 12,750 
R-squared 0.088 0.088 0.088 
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 Table 4. Regional Development Level and Stock Price Informativeness 
This table presents the test of H2 and H3. Region is measured by Intermediary and Levies in Panel A 
and Panel B, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 1.  This table presents the test of H1. 
Variables are defined in Table 1.  We control for industry-cluster effects. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 
 
Analyst Broker Report 
Coverage 0.038* 0.050* 0.009** 
 
(2.430) (2.365) (3.143) 
Coverage*Region -0.004 -0.005 -0.001* 
 
(-1.998) (-1.673) (-2.746) 
Region 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 
 
(8.587) (8.148) (9.439) 
SIZE -0.526*** -0.534*** -0.523*** 
 (-31.303) (-31.760) (-33.526) 
NSOE -0.222*** -0.223*** -0.220** 
 (-4.720) (-4.795) (-4.567) 
Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.688) (0.721) (0.681) 
OwnCon 2.135*** 2.027*** 2.153*** 
 (9.169) (8.533) (9.340) 
Big4 0.019 0.019 0.018 
 (0.120) (0.126) (0.112) 
Foreign -0.358 -0.377 -0.331 
 (-0.567) (-0.595) (-0.524) 
Fund 2.887*** 2.854*** 2.879*** 
 (10.763) (10.618) (11.060) 
Duality -0.053 -0.052 -0.056 
 (-1.238) (-1.202) (-1.292) 
Dbsize 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.089*** 
 (5.959) (6.216) (5.777) 
Drind -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 
 (-0.441) (-0.528) (-0.525) 
Dssize 0.107 0.102 0.108 
 (1.949) (1.804) (2.005) 
Dmeet -0.061** -0.061** -0.062** 
 (-2.878) (-2.799) (-2.806) 
ST 0.265*** 0.268*** 0.262*** 
 
(5.725) (5.778) (5.715) 
Constant 11.693*** 11.859*** 11.655*** 
 
(32.039) (32.906) (33.946) 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7,059 7,059 7,059 
R-squared 0.132 0.134 0.133 
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Panel B 
 
 
Analyst Broker Report 
Coverage 0.370*** 0.429*** 0.094*** 
 
(5.255) (4.942) (5.989) 
Coverage*Region -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.006*** 
 
(-5.301) (-4.935) (-6.000) 
Region 0.061*** 0.060** 0.054** 
 
(4.658) (4.547) (4.309) 
SIZE -0.529*** -0.535*** -0.528*** 
 (-26.518) (-27.183) (-26.201) 
NSOE -0.226** -0.228** -0.229** 
 (-3.661) (-3.619) (-3.592) 
Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.684) (0.707) (0.669) 
OwnCon 2.006*** 1.918*** 2.038*** 
 (7.349) (6.932) (7.363) 
Big4 0.017 0.021 0.002 
 (0.100) (0.131) (0.009) 
Foreign -0.364 -0.383 -0.321 
 (-0.613) (-0.640) (-0.541) 
Fund 3.132*** 3.088*** 3.114*** 
 (12.205) (11.713) (12.378) 
Duality -0.029 -0.029 -0.035 
 (-0.689) (-0.686) (-0.810) 
Dbsize 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.080** 
 (5.051) (5.282) (4.594) 
Drind 0.003 -0.000 0.005 
 (0.155) (-0.004) (0.231) 
Dssize 0.107* 0.100* 0.113* 
 (2.420) (2.146) (2.714) 
Dmeet -0.056 -0.057 -0.058* 
 (-2.118) (-2.043) (-2.168) 
ST 0.267*** 0.270*** 0.262*** 
 
(5.378) (5.457) (5.329) 
Constant 11.274*** 11.392*** 11.362*** 
 
(33.423) (35.121) (32.817) 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 6,835 6,835 6,835 
R-squared 0.136 0.136 0.138 
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Table 5. Robustness checks 
We use Ψ2 as the dependent variable for robustness checks. Variables are defined in Table 1.  We 
control for industry-cluster effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
 Analyst Broker Report 
Coverage 0.005** 0.006** 0.001** 
 (4.007) (4.084) (3.553) 
SIZE -0.384*** -0.382*** -0.382*** 
 (-33.344) (-32.289) (-45.437) 
NSOE -0.073* -0.073* -0.073* 
 (-2.605) (-2.617) (-2.611) 
Growth 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 
 (4.574) (4.549) (4.640) 
OwnCon 0.908*** 0.917*** 0.897*** 
 (17.700) (17.643) (21.883) 
Big4 -0.127 -0.127 -0.126 
 (-1.109) (-1.104) (-1.093) 
Foreign -0.369** -0.373** -0.354** 
 (-4.337) (-4.316) (-4.208) 
Fund 3.005*** 2.994*** 3.010*** 
 (15.910) (15.790) (16.090) 
Duality -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 
 (-0.608) (-0.615) (-0.593) 
Dbsize -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 
 (-0.654) (-0.659) (-0.655) 
Drind 0.015 0.015 0.014 
 (0.681) (0.678) (0.646) 
Dssize 0.053 0.053 0.053 
 (0.917) (0.922) (0.928) 
Dmeet -0.036** -0.036** -0.037** 
 (-2.980) (-2.950) (-3.223) 
ST 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.200*** 
 (4.940) (4.962) (4.959) 
Constant 8.952*** 8.916*** 8.919*** 
 (30.678) (29.729) (38.771) 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 12,750 12,750 12,750 
R-squared 0.094 0.094 0.094 
 
 
